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The Turbulent Years - 1913-1914 
On Saturday 5 July 1913, the  day a f t e r  the  declaration of a general s t r i k 2  and a 
night of r i o t s ,  Br i t i sh  troops confronted crowds i n  centra l  Johannesburg. They 
dispersed groups i n  the  s t r e e t s ,  and then, forming a square, f i r e d  volley a f t e r  
volley in to  the gathering crgwd. Thereafter, u n t i l  mid-afternoon, they f i r e d  at  any 
c iv i l i an  who came i n t o  view. More than twenty were k i l l ed ,  and several  hundred 
were injured. 
The 4th July had been no l e s s  violent.  Dragoons and Mounted Police, 
wielding pick-handles and f l a t  swords, dispersed a meeting a t  which a general s t r i k e  
i n  support of the  mine workers was t o  be announced. The crowd scat tered,  and 
stopped trams and t r a i n s  running; they burnt down the  centra l  railway s ta t ion  and 
the newspaper building, looted gunsmiths, and broke down shop f ronts .  In 
neighbouring Benoni, where the  s t r i k e  began, crowds rampaged through the  s t r e e t s ,  
burning down buildings and beating up scabs. In  other mining towns there  was an 
uneasy calm. The cycle of violence ended only when Generals Botha and Smuts ( the  
Prime Minister and h i s  Minister of Defence) intervened on Saturday afternoon and 
conceded the  main demands of the  s t r ik ing  miners. 
Two weeks l a t e r ,  a t  a protes t  meeting i n  Cape Town, the  Rev R Balmsworth, 
i n  a scathing condemnation of the shootings, stated:  
If you ask me who were the  worst enemies of the  town 
... I would say, the  mili tary,  and those upper c l a s s  
hooligans who directed t h i s  cruel  work. It is a 
strange thing t o  say, but nobody seemed a f ra id  ~f the  
s t r i k e r s ,  everybody was afra id  of the  soldiers.  
Olive Schreiner, novel is t  and s o c i a l i s t ,  believed the  massacre 
should have served t o  show the  mass of our people i n  
t h i s  country t h e  t r u e  conditions under which we a r e  
l iving.  The death of those innocent persons w i l l  not  
have been i n  vain, if  we make the  l i g h t  it has shed on 
our posit ion a s  c i t i zens  of South Africa one which 
. w i l l  do ina te  our future  actions,  p o l i t i c a l  and 
socia l .  8 
I n  a l e t t e r  t o  Edward Carpenter, she wrote: 
If they shoot us down i n  t h i s  way the  moment WHITE 
labourers s t r i k e ,  what w i l l  it be whenever the  nat ive  
moves? And they a r e  bringing i n  more and more 
oppressive laws against  the  l a t t e r .  We have jus t  
passed a t e r r i b l e  native Lang B i l l  - the  worst b i t  of 
work we have done f o r  years. 
It was too much t o  hope tha t  i n  Scwth Africa whitas would have learnt "the 
true conditions under which (they) were living", but Olive Schreiner's fear  of what 
would happen when the black workers moved war, tragically borne out on Friday 9 
J a n w y  1914. White railway men were out, and a general s t r ike  imminent, when 
several hundreq Sotho workers refused t o  go underground at the diamond mine i n  
Jagersfontein. They were confronted, not by troops but by over a hundred white 
workers, armed with shotguns, r i f l e s  srnd revolvers. Several v o l l e p  were fired, 
k i l l ing  a t  l eas t  sixteen and wounding thirty-six (soate seriously). 
F i r s t  press reports of this massstem were buried among news of the railway 
s t r ike  - and what appeared was bizarre. Nine thousand blacks had r isen and stormed 
into the town, but were driven back by 500 neighbouring farmers, alongside miners 
armed by the diamond company; white women and chihdren reputedly f led to F a u r W t h  
or nearby h i l l s ,  or found refuge i n  the town hall. Later reports were still 
alarmist, but gave more details.  Following the death of one of the i r  conspatriots, 
the Sotho i n  the mine stopped work and "were i n  a most turbulent statet3. They had 
"created much disturbance and smashed a number of houses i n  the coarpoundw after 
moving in i t i a l l y  Iqdeterminedly towatjds the town, and it was only a shower of bulleta 
which impeded the i r  mad rush . . . 'l. 
Much was ascribed t o  the example set by white workers, and the Deputy 
Inspector of Mines, saying that  the Sotho were aware of the s t r ike  on the Raxd, 
concluded that:  
They ... understood tha t  the whites were actually 
fighting - probably from not being able t o  distinguish 
i n  meaning between s tr iking and fighting. It is 
notorious how quickly natives ge t  into a d  how easily 
they become affected by excitement anflunrest. 
Further comment is unnecessary ( s ic ) .  
He also claimed tha t  the main culpri ts  were several hundred Sotho workers, 
transferred rom the Premier diamond mines i n  Pretoria, a f t e r  s t r iking seven weeks 
previously." He tldismissed without comment1v complaints of "abuse of natives by 
miners (which) were of the most vague and i l lusive charactertt. It was "purely a 
matter of r iot ing and disofger among a proportion of the native employees having had 
t o  be met by armed force". 
Yet, Daniel Molipha (or Molifa), a Sotho miner, had died as the resu l t  of 
injuries received underground, and three white miners were accused of murdering him. 
One man was charged, but went f ree because of 'tinsufficient evidenceI1, and the 
Attorney General refused t o  prosecute the others. There the matter rested - one 
further moment i n  the history of South Africa's working class  tha t  w a s  buried w i t h  
its victims, un t i l  disinterred many decades la ter .  
In t h i s  paper we focus on some of the struggles of the pre-war years, and 
explore the factors that  led t o  the radicalization of leading members of the 
all-white South African Labour Party (SALP). What seems t o  need explanation is not 
only th i s  change but, given the extent of the clashes, why so few were affected; 
and why it was the s t r ikes  of white workers (and miners, i n  particular) - but not 
the struggles of other ethnic groups - tha t  pushed them t o  the l e f t .  
Struggles, Convergent and Divergent 
There was l i t t l e  peace i n  the Union of South Africa before the outbreak of the F i rs t  
World W a r .  The inst i tut ions of the new s t a t e  had t o  be restructured, or developed, 
and tha t  included unifying the railways, drafting a national budget, establishing a 
new and unified defence force. The whites s p l i t  into host i le  camps a f t e r  1912, and 
Afrikaner nationalism re-emerged under the wing of General Hertzog's National Party, 
with a populist rhetoric against British imperialism and demands for  equal language 
rights. Concurrently, Gandhi emerged a s  a leader of the Indian petty bourgeoisie i n  
a campaign against discriminatory taxes and marriage laws, precipitating a s t r ike  of 
indentured labourers on the sugar f ie lds  and the c o l l $ ~ r i e s .  Africans, smarting a t  
the i r  inferior position in  the new Union constitution , were devastated by the new 
Land Act, and black women in the Free State campaigned against the passes; 
meanwhile, white workers, particularly on the Rand, were engaged in bitter struggles 
to improve working conditions, stop redundancies, and secure recognition for their 
trade unions. 
Perhaps the polticians anticipated trouble in 1913. The press painted a 
sombre picture, lightened only by stories of society scandals. There were warnings 
of a black revolt, reports on the conflict between Botha and Hertzog, fears of war 
in the Balkans, and concern over widespread famine in the countryside and economic 
stagnation in the towns. One commentator, referring to mid-1913, said: 
Depression reigned in South Africa; the unemployed 
wailed; the unemployable agitated; uncertainty 
stalked everywhere; we rsre all carrying on a 
hand-to-mouth existence. 
This was the backdrop to demonstrations, passive resistance, and strikes; 
imprisonments, massacres, and illegal deportations. 
In May the miners at the New Kleinfontein mine came out, and all eyes 
turned to the Witwatersrand. Even the Balkan crisis took second place. In Britain, 
the Daily Chronicle, noting that the Rand produced 42% of the total world gold, 
predicted "dire financial disaster" if its flow were interrupted, with "grave 
difficulties on the (world) money markets ... and a crushing blow to thelgnion of 
South Africa whose ... gold industry is the keystone (to its  finance^)^^. The 
Daily News, fearing war in Europe, urged the Botha government to stfq the strike 
spreading, lest there be a temporary curtailment of the gold supply , and the 
Financial Times spoke of "financial crisis" if shipments were suspended for long. 18 
Only the Financier and Bullionist said that "without adequate finai2cial preparations 
being made" the strike could not last, but added in its next issue that, even if 
settled soon, there ould still be political uncertainty and a flsomewhat dubious 
outlook for money". 1!Y 
Strikes on the Rand reverberated through the country, and there were 
threats of workers joining them in the larger towns. No other campaign in 1913-14 
affected the social and economic fabric of the country as did a strike in the gold- 
fields, and no other protest brought so many persons into action. All other 
protests were confined to specific ethnic groups: Africans alone protested over the 
Land Act, and Africans and Coloureds condemned the arrest of black women in the OFS; 
Sotho workers were shot in Pretoria and Jagersfontein but evoked no protest meeting, 
despite condemnation in the Basutoland Council. Only the Indian campaigns had the 
support of a few des8ted white intellectuals - most white workers and llsocialists" 
being antagonistic. 
The indifference, or open antagonism, to the struggles of other ethnic 
groups reflected inter-community conflicts. The African Congress rejected a 
resolution of solidarity with white strikers in July 1913; Coloured leaders all but 
ignored the massacre of hites; and Gandhi said he would not campaign when white 
workers were on strike.lY White workers ignored the struggles of ~the~~caannities, 
or turned their guns on them! The SALP wanted all Indians repatriated , and 
supported the Land Act b35ause "the government was carrying out one of the planks of 
the . . . Party platformtf. 
These ethnic conflicts permeated the entire society, encompassing white 
workers and overseers who spurned the labourers, the "gangeru (or contracting white 
miner) who was "baastl to his black "gang", and all who employed black servants - 
whether they were White, Coloured or Indian. Barriers due to religion, language and 
culture were not impermeable, but were none the less there and affected members of 
all ethnic groups.' The overbearing attitude of whites, and particularly of workers, 
combined the contempt of the artisan c$$ss for the unskilled worker with that of 
colonial overmaster to local "nativew. 
Ultimately, the relationship between man and man, and between the ethnic 
groups, was influenced by events on the mines, which dominated the economy. 
Together with the railways, tramways and docks, which serviced the mines and were 
controlled by the state or local authorities, they employed most of the country's 
working class outside of agriculture and domestic service. Thus, most labour 
legislation reflected the interests of the mines, and this reinforced the divisions 
of labour along colour lines in the country. It also decided the position of black 
women in society - but that was largely by exclusion. In the early decades of the 
twentieth century, the towns on the Witwatersrand were overwhelmingly male dominated 
and this sex imbalance had a profound effect on family2gelationships, and a 
devastating effect on the development of the children. 
There is one further dimension of ethnic division that has not previously 
attracted attention - and needs further investigation. Struggles by different 
ethnic groups did not reinforce each other, but set communities even further apart. 
The whites on strike demanded that blacks be kept out of some occupations; black 
women opposed passes that whites insisted they carry; black miners wanted bullying 
overseers removed, and so on. There were also slogans (or beliefs), and methods of 
struggle, that set the groups apart. Satyagraha and courting arrest was not a 
tactic that many whites would adopt, and the millenarian beliefs expressed by Indian 
labourers during their strike (and particularly their hope that rajahs would rescue 
them - or punish them!) could find little resonance within other communities. 
Black Friday ... and Bloody Saturday 26 
There were 38,500 white workers employed on the Witwatersrand in 1913: some 22,000 
on the mines and 4,500 on the railways, the rest distributed in t99 building trade, 
tramways, print shops, electric power works, and small workshops. The,mines 
employed some 200,000 Africans, mostly as underground labourers; other Africans 
were employed in domestic service (or as washermen), or in the many workshops. All 
were unskilled, and most were employed as heavy manual workers, or as carriers and 
cleaners. 
Trade unions consisted of only a tiny minority of the work force and were 
almost all craft dominated, restricted to whites, and concerned with wages and work 
conditions. If they had any political aims, it was for the reservation of certain 
jobs for whites or, more ominously, that all Africans be removed from the towns. 
The Transvaal Miners Association (TMA) argued differently: they opposed the use of 
whites as unskilled workers, and, fearing competition, they wanted black labourers 
restricted to unskilled jobs. Furthermore, the TMA1s main aim was not higher wages 
but recognition of the union, an eight-hour day bank-to-bank - to shorten the time 
at the working face - and to combat the dreaded "white death1! (or minerst phthisis). 
Phthisis, caused by the inhalation of white rock particles, produced by 
drilling and dynamiting, was the greatest killer on the Rand, accounting for 
thousands of deaths every year, cutting down the average life expectancy to five, or 
only four, years in many cases - and eve where the miners did not die "their active 
working life . . . (was) only four yearstt.98 Until this was controlled, the one 
ameliorating factor would be a shorter working day. Lord Gladstone, in a dispatch 
to the Colonial Office, after the 1913 strike, said that: 
The principal factor (for the unrest) has undoubtedly 
been the growing realization ... of the frightful 
risks from the ravages of miner's phthisis to which 
their work exposes them ... They gamble with their 
lives for high wages, but there remains the haunting 
dread of the future, and to earn El00 a month (sic) is 
for them no soporific . 
... phthisis has made their life abornmal, and the 
capitalists who are the only visible beneficiaries 
under the system ... have become ... the focus of a29 
bitter class hatred on the part of many of the men. 
R L Outhwaite, the British MP who was on the Rand during the minerst 
strike in 1907, said that the action aimed at Itan intolerable death-dealing tyrannytf 
and "endeavour(ed) to b~&ak ... the terrible relationstt leading to the high 
mortality in the mines. Reynoldls Newspaper, in several articles on the gold . 
mines which caused a stir on the  &nd, gave s t a t i s t i c s  of f a t a l i t i e s  under the  
headline "City of Dreadful Deatht1 , and D Ivon Jones wrote t o  say t h a t ,  of the  15 
men on the 1907 s t r i k e  committee whose names were known, t en  had since died of 
phthis is ,  thrg8 had the  disease but were still a l ive ,  and only one other was known 
t o  be l iving.  The issue was summed up by a pro-labour paper t h a t  said:  
Phthisis  must be destroyed o r  it w i l l  destroy the  
mines, and with them the  Rand. This is wher 
length of the  day comes i n t o  the  discussion. g3the 
However, t h a t  w a s  not  the  whole story.  There was deep resentment amongst 
Labour supporters against  the g o v e ~ p e n t ,  the  mine magnates and the  press (which was 
regarded as being i n  t h e i r  hands). Since 1911 the  TMA had fought the  Randlords 
over the reduction of overtime pay and retrenchment, victimization of union 
o f f i c i a l s ,  and the  refusal  of management t o  ~scognize  the  union o r  even communicate 
with union o f f i c i a l s  on concil iat ion boards. I n  addition, it was claimed t h a t  
there  was fea r  i n  some towns e s t  marginal mines be closed without notice,  and the 
men l e f t  without employment. 3h 
Yet, i n  a l l  the  conf l ic ts  with management, the  white workers and t h e i r  
supporters showed only contempt f o r  the Af r i~ans .  In what must stand as the  most 
cynical of the many statements of the time, t h a t  of the Evening Chronicle, sturdy 
champion of the  miners, surpasses a l l  others. In an e d i t o r i a l  column, the  paper 
provided a rough calculation of the  cost  t o  management of shortening the  working day 
t o  provide an 8-hour bank-to-bank day. They estimated t h a t ,  if  applied t o  a l l  
workers, the annual cost  would be f600,000, but if only white workers were 
considered the  cos t  would be f300,OOO. The edi tor  concluded: 
O u r  own view is t h a t  there  is very l i t t l e  objection.to 
such d i f f  e n t i a l  treatment if  the  t rue  losses  can be 
adjusted. $7 
When the  clash came, it w a s  at t h e  New Kleinfontein mine i n  Benoni - and 
the  issue was union act iv i ty :  
The management a t  l a s t  arrived a t  the  f a c t  t h a t  they 
were losing a good deal of profij&and appointed a new 
manager t o  'cleanse the  s t ab le1 . .  
The new manager, E H Bulman, was reputedly a hard task master, and together with a 
new und ound manager secured the  dismissal o r  resignation of "redundantw . 
miners.Q'sHe a l so  cancelled the  Saturday half-day holiday t h a t  mechanics had long 
enjoyed, and when they protested replaced them by non-union labour. 
The Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) and the  TMA demanded t h a t  the  
Saturday half-day be restored, but management was adamant. The Transvaal Federation 
of Trades ( the  t rade union federal  body) got  a s t r i k e  committee elected,  and 
demanded the reinstatement of the  sacked and recognition of the  W. By 27 May, 
engine drivers and reduction workers were out  and the  s t r i k e  was complete. The 
management re t reated when to ld  by an inspector of labour t h a t  the  dismissals 
contravened the  Indust r ia l  Disputes Prevention Act, but would not  communicate 
di rect ly  with the4pion.  On 12 June, with the  s t r i k e  still t o t a l ,  the  management 
brought i n  scabs. 
On 19 June miners a t  Van Ryn came out i n  sympathy with New Kleinfontein. 
Ruo days l a t e r  f i v e  s t r i k e  leaders4yere arrested,  and infur ia ted workers a l l  but 
stormed the Benoni police s ta t ion.  Thereafter, workers l e d  by pipers i n  highland 
a t t i r e  and women carrying red banners marched t o  mines and Victoria Fa l l s  and 
Transvaal Power Cornany (W) s ta t ioag (which supplied e l e c t r i c i t y  t o  the  mines), 
appealing t o  the workers t o  come out ; they were seldom turned away. By the  end 
of June nine mines were i d l e  - except fa pump-men, permitted by the  s t r i k e  
committee t o  s tay,  t o  prevent flooding. 
Scabs were attacked, houses burnt down, and G W Mason, a union o f f i c i a l ,  
quoting Jack London, declared a t  a meeting: 
No scab had any r igh t  t o  l ive  as long ag there was a 
pool of water deep enough t o  &mm him in,  or  a rope 
long enough t o  hang him w i t h .  
The government brought i n  540 Royal Scots i n  a show of force, but by 2 July the 
s t r ike  had spread t o  many of the VFP stations. A broader committee took control and 
declared a general s t r ike  which was t o  be announced a t  the Johannesburg market 
square on Friday 4 July. The meeting w a s  banned under the old Transvaal Republic 
Law 6 of 1894 (forbidding meapngs, and allowing troops t o  disperse more than s ix  
persons on a public square). But a similar ban had been defied in  Benoni on 29 
June, and it was not believed tha t  t h i s  would be any different. 
The meeting began, but when the third speaker rose troops and mounted 
police wielding pick-handles charged and knocked people down indiscriminately. When 
the crowd retal ia ted with stones and bottles,  swords were dram, and again and 
(using f l a t  blades) the crowd w a s  driven back, reformet, and met a new onslaught. 
People scattered, halted the t rains ,  stopped the trams , and s e t  the centre of 
Johannesburg ablaze (see p 68). And there were running bat t les  between police and 
those who had seized guns. 
On the 5th the General Strike on the Rand was complete, and in  the early 
afternoon, as crowds collected near the Rand Club, the Dragoons formed a square and 
fired. Press reports, and Gladstoners dispatches, exonerated the troops but eye- 
witnesses told a different story. One man a t  the scene wrote: 
Opposite the (Rand) Club the cavalry came t o  the ha l t  
and dismounted, the crowd flying for  safety t o  the 
pavements. The crowd finding the military did not 
pursue, halted and watched the scene, and whilst some 
were thus standing and others trying t o  ge t  away, a 
volley was f i red (blank, so I am informed). Seeing 
tha t  no harm was done the crowd still watched. 
Practically without an interval another volley w a s  
f i red  - bal l  t h i s  time - and they dropped. Altogether 
eight or  nine volleys were f i red  and I believe 
everyone in  the vicinity w i l l  agree tha t  there w a s  no 
appreciable pause between any of the volleys. It w a s  
load and f i r e .  The crowds were running, and as  they 
ran the shots were pouring into them. I saw the 
f i r ing ,  saw the people drop. I was through the w a r  
with the f i r s t  Cavalry Brigade, but I have never seen 
such a s ight  as the &discriminate shooting of men, 
women, and children. 
49 Over 20 lay dead,5pd over 200 were wounded . Correspondents likened the 
events t o  the Paris Commune , but th@ was fanciful. The workers were W i o u s ,  but 
did not t ry  t o  remove the government. Lumpen elements us@ the occasion t o  loot 
the stores of Indians in  Vrededorp, Fordsburg and Newlands. Even i n  Benoni, the 
centre of greatest violence, there were no signs of an assault  on the s tate .  The 
goods s tat ion was burnt t o  the ground, scabs assaulted and some of the i r  houses or  
possessions destroyed, wagons held up o r  destroyed, and, according t o  one report, 
"The Red Flag has been supreme ... it waves5~om hundreds of houses and stores. The 
police and military have been impotent ...I1 The government summonsed 800-1,000 
cavalrymen to  the Rand the following morning54 and the red flags disappeared. 
On the afternoon of the 5th, Botha and Smuts travelled from Pretoria and 
agreed a truce with the Federation: appearing t o  supercede but acting i n  concert 
w i t h  the mining magnates. The s t r ike  was called off and a l l  disturbances were t o  
end; there was t o  be no victimization, and workers1 gr ie~ances~gould  be
investigated. The government undertook t o  compensate the scabs , but tha t  waa 
disavowed by the trade unions. Part of the waiting crowd rejected the truce, with 
c r ies  of "What about the shooting?I1 "What about the dead?" and lrYoulve been 
bought."56 g p e r s ,  who accepted the truce, agreed that it should have b- voted on 
by s t r ikers .  Mary Fitzgerald, Dave Kendall, (?) Horak (representing Afrikaner 
workers), and others claimed the settlement of red nothing to the vast majority who 58 
came out, and resolved to continue the strike. But there was no organization or 
means to continue, and men returned belatedly to work. 
On Sunday the strike committee constituted itself as a Committee of Public 
Safety, posting pickets at hotels, bottle stores and other threatened premises, 
while police and military guarded public buildings, bankg9 and residences of 
magnates, the Chief of Police and the Public Prosecutor. Of the 120 persons 
arrested ogoSaturday, 25 were charged with looting, the rest with llpublic 
violencen. 
Some Africans stopped work in June, at times encouraged by trade unionists 
who grasped the need for joint working-class action. R B Waterston, a strike 
leader, using a crude version of the artificial mine language, called on black 
workers to lvTchella 10 Baas uena fbna mania@ m a l i  aad picmniny sebendl (Tell the 
bosses you want more money and less work), but many white workers disapproved; and 
Dan Simons caused a stir in his address a a Benoni open-air meeting, with the words 
"Ladies, Gentlemen, and Kaff ir Brethrentq. 81 
After the 5th, many black workers came out, demanding higher wages, or 
wages deducted for days in which the mine had b82n idle. At several mines Africans, 
wearing red rosettes, refused to go underground , and demanded 5s a day (compared 
the existing wage of 2s). However, most were driven back to work by troops, mounted 
police, or white workers, and threats of instant dismissal. "Ring leaderstf and 
those who would not resume work were arrested. Once again, British troops 
confronted the workers, with bayonets drawn, firing overhead or "into the ground 
near their feet", or charging with iron-shod pick-handles; one eye-witness claiming 
that two ggrkers were killed at the Meyer and Charlton by men of the Staffordshire 
Regiment. Some workers demanded the elease of imprisoned colleagues, or at City 
and Suburban shouted "Kill the Police"6', but the strike was over. 
The General Strike of 1914 
If the miners struck alone, Johannesburg could still 
contrive to get along for a time - probably for longer 
than the mines could hold out; if the railwaymen 
struck too, the case of Johannesburg was de~perate.~~ 
Round Table 
Throughout July there was talk, first of resuming the strike, then of a 
"suspended strike" (allowing for a walk out at any time), and finally at the end of 
the month the Federation of Trades decided to abandon the strike @d "rely upon our 
industrial and political organizations to remedy our grievances1*. During this 
period the government was condemned by the Federation and the Amalgamated Society of 
Railway and Harbour Servants (ASRHS) for refusing to recognize the railwaymen's 
union, and not investigating workers' complaints - chief of which were the long 
hours worked by train crews, and the pay of unskilled white workers who received 3s 
4d, 48, grj at most 5s per day, when bare subsistence was said by the union to be 8s 
per day. 
General Smuts said that accepting the terms of the strike leaders on the 
5th was Ifone of B e  hardest things (he had) ever had to do", and he resolved to be 
ready next time. Contingency plans were drafted, requesting that in the event of 
a fresh strike available imperial troops be placed at the disposal of the 
government; advising mayors on procedures to be followed; and allocating control 
officers and headquarters in twelve central areas. Proclamations were drafted, to 
be signed by the Governor-General and Smuts when required, ggecifying measures to 
suppress disturbanaes and maintain order and public safety. 
Reports of dynamite being f o ~ d  on railway platforms, in culverts, and so 
on, added to the state of uncertainty. In September 1913, when the government was 
still investigating workers' conditions, in fulfilment of the July agreement, the 
Minister for railways announced that retrenchments would be necessary, and on 
Christmas eve the first dismissal notices were handed out, possibly as a 
provocation, because the railways were busy and men were working overtime. 
J H Poutsma, the union secretary, had threatened to stop the railways at the first 
sign of dismissals, and a strike was called for Friday 8 January. 
Meanwhile, on 2 January, white miners in the Natal collieries c m  out, 
demanding 20s per day, a 57 hour week, and overtime at time-and-a-half. They also 
demanded the reinstatement of four men, laid off because there was a shortage of 
black labour. Over a thousand black workers also took action, demanding E5 per 
month, but they went back when warned that the strike was illegal. The whites 
called for a general strike, and that posed the threat qf a national coal shortage. 
Although their executive demurred, the threat remained. 
There were fears of a coal shortage when the eilway strike started on the 
8th, and this was to influence events at Jagersfontein. Most railway workshop 
employees came 0 u 5 ~  as did the train crews in some districts - but too few to cause 
much dislocation. There were doubts about the role played by Poutsma in what 
happened: he did not consult the branches, nor other unions with members on the 
railways, and there were few signs of preparation, locally or nationally. Members 
of the Federatjan advised against the strike, and they were furious when the strike 
was announced. However, there were sympathy walk-outs by typographers, building 
and Municipal workers, and colliery workers, indicative of the depression and 
discontent of the time. A week later, just over 9,000 gold miners were out. The 
Federation closed ranks, and after a ballot a general strike was called for the 
14th. This was countered by a declaration of Martial Law, and the total number of 
workers who responded is unknown, but in the confusion numbers had little meaning. 
Strikers first tried, unsuccessfully, to pull the train crews out, and 
then the signalmen, and there was also some attempts at sabotage. Official sources 
listed thirty-eight instances in which portions of lines were blown away, explosions 
occyjred on trains, or on railway property, points were interfered with, and so 
on. But the strike could not have succeeded - and some suspected at the time 
"that the crisis was deliberately sought and qgepared for by the g~vernment*~ to
destroy the trade unions and the Labour Party , with Poutsma as the witting or 
unwitting tool. On the 7th troops occupied railway stations and workshops in 
Johannesburg, Germiston and Pretoria. Poutsma, Justin Nield (his dfjquty) and Colin 
Wade of the SALP were arrested on the loth, and held incommunicado. Then came 
Martial Law on the 13th, the proclamation and special passes for pfgvement in 
proclaimed areas having been printed in anticipation in December. 
Tlygnature of Smuts' measures was described in the latter of 21 January by 
SALP leaders : 
The situation prevailing here is intolerable, and 
quite unprecedented under the British flag and 
constitution. 
The story which has been put about by the South 
African press and no doubt cabled home, of a 
Syndicalist Revolution, is entire rubbish, and without 
the slightest foundation, being designed partly for 
British consumption, and partly to enlist middle class 
sympathy out here. 
... It is a deliberate effort to suppress their 
political opponents by removing the leaders and 
terrorising the rank and file, and at the same time to 
swamp Hertzogism by exciting Dutch racialism against 
the 'common enemy'. 
The whole affair has been on our side a peaceful 
and industrial dispute: the Mass Meeting on Sunday, 
January 11th on Market Square was not only perfectly 
orderly, good humoured and self controlled, but it 
afforded a dramatic proof that the disturbances of the 
previous July were directly due to the action of the 
Police and soldiery in charging the crowd. 
On this occasion not a Policeman or soldier was to 
be seen, and although the Authorities had suspended 
the local tram service, the crowd was greatly larger 
than the one that had collected on July 4th. 
The authors listed the stringent measures imposed under martial law. The offices of 
trade unions and the SALP had been raided, as had printing shops that produced 
leaflets for the labour movement - and their machines destroyed. There were 
arrests, without legal help being allowed, of MPS (Creswell and T Boydell), of 
Provincial and town councillors, and of candidates in forthcoming elections - and 
of the entire executive of the ASE and the ASRHS, although all opposed violence. 
The severest sentences are anticipated and the 
deportation of the Leaders is believed to be imminent. 
Railway and mine workers are being evicted everywhere. 
It is an offence ... to advise any person to strike or 
to continue to strike or to assist a striker or his 
family in any way. The police also looted thnoStrike 
Distress Committee's food supply in Pretoria. 
There were bans on wearing SALP col.ours, on the red flag, or using the 
words ttscab't and ttblacklegtl, said the writers. llA man got E2 or fourteen days for 
looking 'sneeringlyt at a Policeman ...lt Permits were needed to cross magisterial 
boundaries, or to use wheeled vehicles (and these were usually refused), meetings of 
more than six persons were banned, news censgfed, and prominent persons restricted 
to their houses or shadowed by police spies. An elaborate system of passports was 
used to stop strikers intercommunicating; persons approaching public buildings 
could be shot on sight; all persons found "guilty1' of supplying food to 
strikers were Itpenalisedlt. 
The letter to the Colonial Office took the account further: 
All centres are swarming with Burghers, who are to be 
allowed to retain their arms and accoutrements 
permanently. Racialism has been directly revived by 
the Government through this means and has received 
great impetus ... 
The public is menaced everywhere by Police, 
Burghers and Civilian Force with fixed bayonets. 
Unoffending people walking the streets are ruthlessly 
handled, herded into arcades, and driven like cattle 
to the Charge Office under Police guard. 
Apart from all questions of detail, the serious 
features are that, as in the case of the Indians, the 
armed forces of the country are being used, not to 
suppress violence, but to terrorise men into working. 
Secondly. That the public services of the country, 
such as post, telegraph, telephone and the public 
press are being controlled under the pretext of 
Martial Law merely so as to prevent incitement to 
violence but to prevent any criticism of the 
Government and to avoid any information being made 
public either here or in England which the Government 
finds inconvenient. Thirdly. That these things are 
being done for Party Political purposes, relating 
partly to the domestic issues between Botha and 
Hertzog, but still more to the tacit combination of 
Botha and the capitalists to stem the rising forces of 
theLabow Party, in particular of Botha's public and 
repeated assertio8g that tsocialism cannot be allowed 
in South Africat. 
After commenting on General de la Reyls statement that his men had responded "to the 
call of their party, which was represented by the Government in powertg, they 
concluded that the government's actions would Itundoubtedly be endorsed by the Union 
Parliamentt1, and they hoped the Indemnity Bill would be vetoed by the king. 
Some 70-100,000 men from the army, defence force, police, and burgherS4 
tlcommandosll were called up by the government - including many who were strikers - 
and special constables were enrolled to replace police called up for strike duty. 
All ra' ways, communication networks, power stations, and mines were placed under 85 guard. On 15 January the mass round up of trade unionists began. First, the 
Pretoria and Johannesburg strike committees, and hundreds of nlstrikersvl in Benoni. 
Activists in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Volksrust, Bloemfontein, Cape Town, and 
so on, were arrested. The armed forces were instructed to root out the forces of 
t*anarchyfv, and the nadir of this action consisted of investing the Trades Hall with 
4,000 troops, training a field gun on the building, and demanding the surrender of 
the incqkents - eleven members of the Federation executive, and thirty-two 
pickets. 
The use of the army was not without its own internal contradictions. 
There were 30,000 burghers under arms, and there was open talk of the commanders 
arresting Botha and Smuts, and proclaiming a Republic. Denys Reitz, a Botha man, 
recalled that the troops he led from Heilbron, in th~~0FS, had to be harangued for 
two days before they would cross into the Transvaal. They also meant to discredit 
the government - thus General Beyers, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief, gave 
orders in Germiston to arrest leevery man if he looked like a striker ...", and, 
marching at the head of&s troops, deliberately created a great deal of resentment 
among orderly citizens. Whether other brutalities were similarly motivated is not 
recorded. Troops wielded sjamboks and rifle butts indiscriminately, affg men a d  
women were herded into cattle pens, or marched several miles to gaols. By way of 
contrast, members of Commandos fraternized with strikers in some districts, after 
hearing their complaints. 
The men went back defeab~d. Nearly 700 railwaymen were retrenched, and 
many accepted lower rates of pay. The position of the ASRHS was precarious, with 
the men I1crushed and dispirited" and working under conditions that left them in 
despair. They could "not cease work, nor absent themselves from duty, nor write to 
the press, nor in any way communicate their grievances to the public - und~r the 
threatened penalty of six monthsn hard labour, or a fine of f50, or botht1. There 
was also widespread victimization. Hundreds of strikers were blacklisted; former 
executive members of the ASRHS were dismissed, and in some regions membership of the 
union was proscribed. 
The ultimate move by Smuts was covertly to move nine men on the night of 
27/28 January from prison in Johannesburg, and place them on the rlWQIMC1l in Durban. 
Despite attempts by members of the SALP to have this illegal deportation stopped, 
the boat could not be stopped atg$ea and the men, not all of them leaders of the 
strike, were shipped to Britain. Smuts was indemnified by parliament, but he had 
antagonized many people and this was made obvious by the election results for the 
Transvaal Provincial Council elections, in which the SALP made significant advances 
and won 23 seats. 
The Natal Indian Workers1 Strike 93 
For ninety years after emancipation, sugar planters 
and sugar workers ... worked out the inheritance of 
slavery ... As part of the world demand for raw 
materials, the Indians voyaged across the seas ... to 
labour upon the plantations ... 
Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery 94 
From 1860 to 1911 Indian indentured labourers arrived in South Africa 
primarily to wsgk on the sugar plantations, and then in the collieries, the railways 
and elsewhere. In 1903, the Indian g~vernmen&~set a quota after the rejection of 
its demand that legal disabilities be mitigated , but the system continued until . 
stopped by the Union government in 1911. The whites of South Africa divided on the 
issue. Employers saw advantages: indent%yd labour was not easily organizable, and 
wages on the plantations were sub-minimal. The housi~g was squalid, the rations 
poor, and hours of work during the busy season inhuman. But traders opposed their 
Indian counterparts (most of whom arrived to cater for the labourers); and white 
workers, trade union leaders and members of the SALP were vehemently anti-Indian and 
urged repatriation, fearing that white wages would be undercut. 
Men were promised a free return passage after five years1 indentured and 
five years1 I1k.eelt service, or a plot of land. To discourage those who opted to 
stay, a E3 yearly tax was imposed in 1902 on every non-indentured adult who had 
arrived after 1895, and their children (including girls over 12 years and boys over 
16). There were other discriminatory measures, including the proposed invalidation 
of customary marriages (partly to prevent spouses of multiple marriages entering the 
country), a bar on crossing provincial borders without p e r m i t ~ , ~ ~ d  a register for 
Indians in the Transvaal (to determine the right of residence). 
The provincial and national Indian associations petitioned and agitated 
against these discriminatory and offensive regulations, and Gandhi conducted a 
personal crusade to get them repealed, co-operating at times with some of the Indian 
organizations. His Satyagraha (akin to ltsoul-forcetl, which disavowed active 
retaliation against an opponent) had little appeal for the indentured worker, with 
whom Gandhi had no empathy, and little, if any, contact. During 1910-11 Gandhi 
campaigned against registration in the Transvaal, but this collapsed when traders 
found that renewing their licences depended on compliance. Thereafter Gandhi called 
for the repeai08f the f3 tax, and the Indian working class responded, far beyond 
expectations. 
The Indian working class in 1913-14 consisted of some 3,800 colliery 
workers, 18,000 on sugar plantaf&pns, 2,700 on public bodies (including railwaymen), 
and 2,500 in other occupations. The colliery workers were the first to respond 
to a strike call by Gandhi and his co-workers, and starting on 14 October some 2,500 
had stoped work by the 27th. The sugar workers started coming out on 5 November, 
and a general strike, called from Monday 10 November, involved some 17-19,000 men 
(and an unsf&ed number of women) for periods ranging from a few days to three or 
four weeks. Newspaper reports indicated that all branches of industry in Durban 
were affected, and that railway workers, municipal se~jfes, messengers, drivers, 
cooks, and even house servants across Natal were out. 
The extent of the strike was indicative of the two factors that weighed on 
every worker: the squeeze they felt in a period of economic depression, and.their 
frustration in trying to escape from servitude. The f3 tax, which acted as a 
barrier to their entering the free labour market, or even escaping from 
proletarianization, was the triggering factor in their entering the strike, but 
their objectives and hopes ranged from that of the more permanent workers, who hoped 
to improve their work condition, to plantation workers living under the most 
degrading conditions and subjected to supervision that was brutal, who believed in 
the intervention 0f~8~rajah who (in one version) would rescue them from their 
desperate position. 
On 14 October 78 workers from the Farleigh colliery came out on strike. 
When ordered to return to work by the 17th or face prosecution, they were joined by 
some 2,000 workers from ninfOgines. One week later, 4-5,000 (including railwaymen) 
were out in northern Natal. Initially, the mines kept working but, although no 
attempt was madfo&o call out the African workers, the strike seriously affected the 
output of coal. On the 29th, the workers were ordered to return, or have their 
rations ( ~ 1 3 c h  many mines still supplied) withdrawn, lose pay and be in breach of 
contract. 
At this juncture the workers joined the satyagrahists in illegally 
crossing the Transvaal border. Gandhi hoped that their arrest would enhance his 
campaign, and the workers would get food and shelter in the goals. From 29 to 31 
October 750 coal miners, some with families, moved towards the border, and within 
days 4,000 were on the march. The first batch of volunteers were arrested and 
sentenced to return to the mines, which were proclaimed outstations of the prisons 
i n  Newcastle and D ~ a e e ,  and forced t o  work under the staff who were appointed 
temporary warders. However, the government w a s  i n  no hurry to arrest mosfogf the 
marchers, and the organizers had t o  supply, and pay for, the marchers' food. 
The ar res t  of Gandhi seemed t o  bring the campaign to an a d ,  and it might 
have collapsed but for  its spread t o  the plantations, Yet no one claimed 
responsibility fo r  calling the plantation workers out, and Gandhi said tha t  he had 
told them emphatically not t o  s t r ike.  Writing t o  Senator Campbell, he said that  
a f te r  his  a r res t  it was "impossible t o  control the m a , l ~ d  the movement became not 
only spontaneous, but it assumed gigantic proportionsq'. Gandhi explained that  he 
had t r ied  t o  confine the s t r ike  t o  the col l ier ies ,  hoping "that this would achieve 
the purpose aimed atf1.  He said nothing about conditioas on the plantations, nor on 
the shooting of s t r ikers  (see below), and he assured the Senator tha t  he was so 
indebted t o  him for trying t o  ge t  the tax repealed that, if he had called the 
plantations out, Campbellfs men would have been l a s t  on the list. 
The s t r ike  of f ie ld  workers and milllfyerators was a mix of peasant revolt 
and industrial  action. Cane f ie lds  were burnt and groups of workers patrolled 
the f ie lds  t o  prevent any work, while others stayed in the i r  barracks and refused t o  
venture out. Local leaders emerged and were defiant. One group confronted by 
police a t  Lamarcy, near Verulam, said tha t  Gandhi had told them to work, and 
"The police could shoot i f  they chose, but they would not work1'. There was a t  
leas t  one clash i n  which there w a s  shooting. Colin Campbell, son of the Senator, 
led troopers across the Mount Edgecornbe e ~ i g t e  t o  persuade workers to go back t o  the 
f ie lds  (by promising t o  r e s t a r t  rations).  Workers who woul$ll~ot comply came 
under gunfire, and a t  l eas t  s ix  were ki l led and forty wounded. 
The s t r ike  b i t  deep i n  N a t a l .  Ships ran short of supplies of bunker- 
coal, and the mines l o s t  export orders they could not be sure of executing. Hotels, 
shops and railways were short of labour, and alternative s t a f f  had to be trained. 
But it was Indian byfinessmen who suffered most, and many were reported t o  be doing 
scarcely any trade. Their support fo r  the campaign, already strained a f t e r  
disputes with Gandhi, was tempered by the need for  a return t o  the s ta tus  quo, and 
they t r ied  t o  cool the situation. On 20 November, while reaffirming support for  
passive resistance, they condemned violence, advised s t r ikers  t o  be patient and give 
no trouble t o  the police, and urged a return t o  work for  some. Members of the Natal 
Indian Association, with police permission, visited the sugar estates  and warned 
w ~ r k e r s ~ ~ a i n s t  leaving the estates  t o  which they were attached, or  resis t ing the 
police. 
No demands on behalf of the workers were ever presented, and no national 
leader(s) intervened t o  s t a t e  the workersf grievances. That alone ensured failure.  
Furthermore, Africans and white women were being employed i n  the town and the 
railways t o  rep+r)ce them, and there were reports of "Indians rushing t o  get back 
the i r  placesf'. In fac t ,  the Indian workers got l i t t l e ,  and many l o s t  the i r  
livelihood or suffered great privations. One estimate placed the i r  losses i n  wages 
and savingflnt well over E30,000, and many women were forced t o  s e l l  t he i r  
jewellery. Living conditions did not improve, and the workers had l i t t l e  t o  show 
for  the i r  militancy and solidarity with the petty bourgeoisie. 
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Our search for  the connections between the many strands of struggle i n  1913-14 
s tar ted in  Jagersfontien, where African and Coloured women (and those of 
B l ~ e m f o n t e i ~ ~ ~ d  Winburg) refused t o  carry passes, or  pay fines,  and were 
imprisoned. The question seemed t o  be whether there were unique conditions in  
t h i s  mining village, leading t o  two significant events over s ix  months, or whether 
t h i s  was only coincidence. 
This required a new look a t  t h i s  province, which had some unique features. 
Firs t ly ,  it had only one tiny Reserve, and blacks were dispersed across the 
Province, on farms and i n  towns. Together with the arr ival  of many women from 
Basutoland, t h i s  accounted for  the almost "normalw sex rat io ,  i n  contrast t o  towns 
in  other Provinces; and women, Coloured and African, were required t o  carry passes 
under regulations that  pre-dated Union. 
Polit ical l i f e  i n  the Free State underwent significant changes in  1913, 
when its branch of the governing party followed General Hertzog into opposition in  
Parliament.. The 1 0 c a $ ~ ~ m y  commanders sided with Hertzog and, presumably, the 
police followed suit .  Which of these events effected increased police action i n  
May is uncertain, but the number of a r res t s  on pass offences increased considerably, 
that of women going up fourfold i n  Bloemfontein. 
A t  first, the women paid the i r  fines,  but from the end of May through 
September women in  Bloemfontein, Winburg and Jagersfontein defied the law and chose 
t o  go t o  prison. They were led by local women, many of them active church members, 
and/or school teachers, or  the wives of ministers, teachers and business men. Half 
the women charged were domestic servants, the others were housewives. Although they 
won (belated) support from the Natives Congress, and from the African Pol i t ical  
Organisation (AP), the in i t ia t ive  was theirs ,  and they faced r idicule  from some of 
the men. Ultimately, they formed the i r  own independent OFS Native and Coloured 
Women's Association, led by Catherina Simmons and Katie Louw, the president of the 
Methodist women's prayer group. It collecte3 funds fo r  the families of women i n  
prison, organized deputations, and mobilized support. 
The f i r s t  protest came a t  the end of May in  Waaihoek location 
(Bloemfontein), when a mass meeting of women resolved not t o  carry passes i f  police 
harassment was not stopped. A deputation t o  the mayor was told tha t  he could not 
change the laws, and a crowd collected a t  the police s tat ion where some eighty women 
tore up the i r  passes - for  which they were charged. On Friday 30th, some 600 women 
marched t o  the court waving walking s t icks,  knobkerries, broom st icks,  and Union 
Jacks. There was a fracas when the police t r ied  t o  clear the court and the women 
lashed out a t  the i r  tormentors. "We have done with pleading, we now demandw, they 
were quoted as  saying. 
The eighty pleaded not guilty but refused to  pay fines and in  t h i s  
instance were dismissed by the court. The idea caught on, and other groups were t o  
emulate them in  the coming months, but it was not always peaceful. On 16 June, a 
near r i o t  followed the a r res t  of a women in  the location for  being without a pass. 
Two of her friends released her, and when a posse of police arrested a l l  three, a 
large crowd collected and followed them t o  the police station. There, it is 
claimed, the police struck a spokeswoman with a sjambok when she asked what the 
charges were, and in  the f igh t  tha t  followed the women wielded sjamboks, threw 
stones, and b i t  the police. The next day Bloemfontein experienced its f i r s t  stay- 
at-homes in  a long history of such actions. No woman was allowed t o  go t o  work, and 
"those tha t  t r ied  t o  escape were &3tenw. Furthermore, said one report, "The meet 
troublesome were the Cape girls1'. 
Thirty-four women were arrested as  a resul t  of the scuff le  with the 
police, and found guilty of public violence; but, rather than pay a f ine,  they went 
t o  gaol fo r  two months. This inspired Sol Plaatje, Secretary of the South African 
Natives National Congress, t o  write i n  Tsala ea Batho of 21 June: 
Let no woman pay a fine. They should a l l  go and f i l l  
the gaol ... Let them build new gap&. It is no 
disgrace t o  f i l l  them f o r  Liberty. 
The praised the women on 14 June, and advised them not t o  do any work while i n  
prison. A fortnight later, they cr i t ic ized men for  not standing up, as had the 
women : 
Our manhood has been almost extinguished. We docilely 
accept almost every abject position, and submit to 
every brutality of the white man, with l i t t l e  more 
than a murmur. Not so our women. They have accepted 
the white man's challenge, and have openly defied him 
t o  do h is  worst. 
There were a r r e s t s  i n  Winburg i n  May, and on 2 June 600 women of the 
location,  singing hymns, marched t o  the  Town Hall and declared they would no longer 
carry passes. The Town Council was nonplussed, and then, following the  lead from 
Bloemfontein, decided t o  prosecute. On 20 June women were given s i x  days within 
which t o  carry passes, and from 1 July the police ar res ted  batches of women, s i x  a t  
a time - the maximum number the  loca l  gaol could take! The penalty was four days i n  
prison, although t h i s  s t i f fened over time and by October was one month o r  a E2 f ine .  
The problem of young women over 16, who were a t  school o r  unmarried and 
not employed by a white person, w a s  highlighted on 15  August with the  a r r e s t  of Ruth 
Pululu, an ass i s t an t  schoolmistress. Inel ig ible  f o r  a r e s iden t i a l  pass on a l l  
counts, she was required t o  take employment i n  domestic s e r v i p ~ ~ o r  go t o  gaol. 
Either course meant t h a t  the school would have t o  close down. 
Pass f ees  were a lso  meant t o  provide pa r t  of the  revenue with which t o  
finance location amenities, and when Winburg's white rate-payers, meeting on 25 
September, were to ld  t h a t  there  was a d e f i c i t  of E700 i n  location accounts, they 
demanded the  immediate a r r e s t  of  the  g u i l t y  women and t h a t  addit ional  gaol  space be 
made available. 
Registers were compared by whites ( i n  a l l  centres of opposition) with 
Br i t i sh  suff raget tes ,  and t h e i r  sport ing of blue rose t t e s  was taken t o  be a mark of 
opposition t o  carrying the  pass, although it is not c l e a r  whether the  i ssue  of the  
vote was raised.  One white woman seemed impressed. Writing anonymously t o  the 
Friend of 11 October, she commended the  protes ters '  courage and cal led  f o r  a 
demonstration of support by whites. Plaat je ,  amongst o thers ,  responded 
enthusias t ica l ly ,  but  t h i s  proved t o  be qui te  misplaced. The Friend receiy$g 
r e p l i e s  t h a t  were largely abusive, and the demonstration never took place. 
The t h i r d  centre of ac t ive  p ro tes t  was Jagersfontein, and the  s i tua t ion  
differed i n  t h a t  there  was an act ive  loca l  branch of the APO and act ive  women i n  
Congress. From May a r r e s t s  commenced, and older women responded by refusing t o  buy 
t h e i r  monthly pass. Negotiations with the town council e l i c i t e d  no response, and a t  
the end of September 60 women were ar res ted  and charged f o r  not having passes. 
Aploon Vorster, described as  a Mozambiquan Lady, was t h e i r  spokeswoman, and was 
sentenced t o  30 days; the others got  seven days. Thereafter, s a i d  the  Friend of 29 
September : 
... a large  number of native g i r l s  paraded the  
s t r e e t s  ... singing, shouting and flaunting the  blue 
ribbon - the  s ign o f  t h e i r  suffragettism. They made 
a rush t o  the spot where the f i f t y  ( s i c )  convicted 
women were under pol ice  guard waiting t o  transport  
them t o  Fauresmith ... (and) police had t o  
requis i t ion the  f i r e  hose t o  disperse them. Later on 
some mounted constables with sjamboks were required 
t o  c lea r  the  s t r e e t s .  
After October, the a r r e s t  of women on pass offences seems t o  have abated - 
although the campaign continued f o r  many months. The issue  ra ised i n  the  address by 
D r  Abduarahman a t  the  annual APO conference i n  October was widely publicized because 
of its v s p l e n e t i c ~ ~  tone and "rabid fulminationsft: 
... t h i s  policy of repression cannot l a s t  much longer. 
If a handful of Indians, i n  a matter of conscience, 
can so  firmly r e s i s t  what they consider in jus t i ce ,  
what could the  coloured races not  do i f  they were t o  
adopt t h i s  pract ice  of passive resistance? We must 
a l l  admire what these Br i t i sh  Indians have shown i n  
t h e i r  determination t o  maintain what they deem t o  be 
t h e i r  r ights .  The inhumanity of the Free S ta te  has 
driven our women t o  r e s i s t  the  law. Thirty four of 
them went t o  gaol r a the r  than carry passes ... I am 
convinced t h a t  i f  our people a s  a whole were prepared 
to suffer likewise, we would gain redress of our most 
serious grievances while General is still alive. 
Are we to be driwnto that course? 
Abdurahman then said that if 200,000 mine workers downed tools, and farm 
labourers refused at harvest time to work for 1s 6d per day, 
the economic foundations of South Afiica would 
suddenly shake and tremble with such violence that the 
beautiful white South African superstructure which had 
been built on it would come down with a crash 
entailing fif9cial ruin such as the world had never 
seen before. 
But the President then switched. He stopped threatening, and pleaded with 
the whites to prevent such a calamity by encouraging the Coloured peoples to 
Ifimprove their position and become more useful citizens". He prescribed the 
upliftment of the "lower classes of coloureds", calling for sobriety and 
prohibition. He wanted an insurance society for Coloureds; and called on all 
Coloured people not subject to the Native Lands Act to aim to buy land. The 
"splenetic" speech turned out to be rather a fuzzy speech - but did indicate that 
the women's struggle had resonated somewhere in the thinking of the Coloured 
leadership. 
' Strikes at the Diamond Mines 
There were several strikes at the smaller diamond mines in 1913-14,.at 
Koffiefontein, Klipdam, Randfontein, Kimberlfg8 Premier Mines, and Jagersfontein, 
many of which have still to be investigated. These events were invariably 
described as riots, but as far as can be ascertained from cursory press reports they 
involved strike action, leading to conflict bet~een~g~ctions of the black work 
force, or between them and white police or workers. Only the shootings at 
Premier mines and Jagersfontein led to significant publicity, but once again strikes 
were ascribed to "tribal" friction, illegal beer drinking, and so on, trivializing 
the event and exonerating the authorities. 
Our informpjhon on events at Premier mines comes mainly from evidence at 
an official inquiry. Mine officials said that on 23 November 1913 a Shangaan 
policeman struck a Sotho worker while stopping gambling and drinking at No 6 . 
compound. There was looting by the offended workers, and then a lull. At 8.00 p.m. 
the Sotho were said to have attacked Shangaan in the compound. Whites intervened to 
stop the "looting and rioting", and the Sotho turned on them. Fortuitously, the 
whites were armed and they firefgfwo volleys, killing four and wounding twenty-four. 
Twenty-two Sotho were arrested. 
The account is too glib, and begs too many questions. What was the cause 
of this lttribalIt friction? Why did the whites intervene, and why were they present 
with guns? Who were the "armed local whites1' who somehow appeared on the scene? 
Why were 300 "trouble makers" transferred to Jagersfontein - a fact that might never 
have been mentioned, had they not been such conve~t5nt scapegoats for the Deputy 
Inspector of Mines in the events of January 1914. 
On Wednesday 7 January, an overseer, F M de Wet Stokenstroom, and two 
white miners assaulted Daniel Molipha variously described as a lfboss-boyf', the 
popular compound barber, and also as a "petty chief". He was kicked and hit while 
down, and had been left unable to move. Workers carried him to the compound, 
bloodied and coverfg3in sweat and mud, then transferred him to hosptial- where he 
died the next day. On Friday morning, one Lenepo led a group to ask about 
Daniel. They saw Nesbitt, the Compound Manager, who said that the doctor ascribed 
the death to a ruptured ulcer, brought on by eating too much porridge, drinking too 
much MBieu (beer) and coffee(! 1,  smoking dagga (cannabis), and to gonorrhoea 
(sic) a135 When they asked to see the General Manager, Nesbitt "kicked them 
away". 
This was too much. I n  u t t e r  d isbel ief ,  the  men cal led on everyone t o  stop 
work u n t i l  an enquiry i n t o  Moliphals death was held. Most Sotho workers refused t o  
go underground, stoning men other  ethnic groups going t o  work, and driving 
whites out of the  compound. l' Attempts were made by o f f i c i a l s ,  and by the  General 
Manager, t o  get  the men back t o  wortQ7but t o  no effect .  Police o f f i ce r s ,  together 
with armed men (many of them miners ) ,arrived and blocked the  three  compound 
gates,  and two volleys were f i r ed ,  leaving dead o r  wounded i n  the  compounds. It is 
not known who gave the  order t o  f i r e ,  o r  i n  f a c t  why the order was given. A t  the  
very worst, one or  more stones were thrown; but even t h i s  w a s  denied. The police 
sergeant was accused of given the  order t o  shoot, and many of the  dead had 
been far from the  gates. Most damning of all ,  Machopane Mahapela, a policeman, 
who appea&j t o  h i s  fellow Sotho t o  surrender, w a s  shot twice by the  whites - and 
lay dead. 
The damage done by the  mineworkers w a s ,  i n  f a c t ,  remarkably s l igh t .  They 
chased the Compound manager and h i s  s t a f f  from the Compound, smashed windows and 
furni ture ,  and seem t o  have taken s o ~ f i ~ f 5 0  and about E300 worth of clothing - 
although even these a re  not certain.  The point-blank shooting a t  unarmed men and 
the  casual t ies  in f l i c ted  on them by the  white vigilantes were out of a l l  proportion 
t o  what the  men did. Many men panicked and t r i e d  t o  escape, but when they clambered 
across the  compound fence they were driven back a t  gun-point. A press 
correspondent, writ ing from the  mine, sa id  t h a t  Itthose who made f o r  the  fence did 
not desire t o  enter the  town but wanted t o  g e t  awaylsfom the  mine, the  shooting, and 
the  general bloodshed, and t o  make f o r  Basutolandl'. 
When to ld  t o  re turn  t o  work, the men declared t h a t  they wanted t o  go home. 
They would not give evidence a t  the  o f f i c i a l  inquiry in to  the  shooting, having 
l i t t l e  confidence i n  speaking t o  white o f f i c i a l s  a f t e r  the  recent,  widely 
publicised, case of P J Pienaar, a farmer i n  the Ladybrand region. Accused of 
k i l l i n g  two blacks ( a  man and h i s  s i s t e r ) ,  and se l l ing  t h e i r  c a t t l e  t o  discharge 
some pressing debts, he w&acquitted by a jury, despite damaging (but 
circumstantial) evidence. Star t ing on S a f ~ d a y ,  some 600 were taken under armed 
guard t o  the  border i n  batches of up t o  200. 
Jwersfontein - whatever did happen? 
A t  one l eve l  there  is a simple answer t o  the  question Whatever did happen a t  
Jagersfontein?" The women i n  the  location,  Coloured and African, and the  men i n  the  
compounds responded t o  regulations o r  t o  a c t s  of b ru ta l i ty ,  confronted t h e i r  
immediate oppressors, and took what action they could. Racism i n  the  Free Sta te  w a s  
harsher, o r  a t  l e a s t  l e s s  eas i ly  countered, and flash-point was soon reached. It 
w a s  the  one Province i n  which there  was no Indian struggle,  but by defaul t  Indians 
were prohibited i n  the  I1Free1' Sta te .  
We can only guess a t  the  contact between the  women and the  men, but w i t h  
the sex-ratio of Jagersfontein a t  around sixteen t o  one, and abnormal f o r  a Free 
S ta te  town, intercourse between mine and town must have been considerable. The men 
would have known of the  r a e n ' s  campaign (as,  indeed, the women knew trouble was t o  
be expected on the  mines ) ,  and t h a t  must have had some impact on t h e i r  own 
actions,  but t h i s  would not account f o r  the  large  number involved i n  the  s t r i k e ,  nor 
the violence. Nor could t h e  contact with the  Free Sta te  women account f o r  the  
s t r i k e  a t  Premier mines. Nevertheless, the  author i t ies  i n  Jagersfontein took 
d ras t i c  action against  the  women. In  March police sealed o f f  the  location and, 
moving from house t o  house, dfvpded passes a t  gun-point. Sixty-one women (over 
half  Coloured) were arrested. 
It is perhaps more f r u i t f u l  t o  look a t  Basutoland, w i t h  which the  men kept 
close l inks ,  and t o  which the  men sought t o  return a f t e r  the  shooting i n  
Jagersfontein. Three issues would have affected the Sotho i n  1913: the  economic 
depression (noted above), accompanied by the  drought over South Africa, which was 
par t icular ly  severe i n  Basutoland, and the f i r s t  request t h a t  the Br i t i sh  
t e r r i t o r i e s  be handed t o  the  Union. The drought was probably the  most important 
issue - and i n  its wake migrant workers, already under economic pressure, would have 
received urgent pleas t o  send money home. 
In March 1913 Botha sought the transfer of Bechuanaland and Swaziland to 
South Africa, as part of a pig to absorb South West Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe), and Mozambique. The Sotho had always opposed incorporation in South 
Africa, and they would have been alerted to continued South African ambitions. It 
is in this light that two official reports can be read: 
. Recent events would seem to indicate ... that the 
British Basuto is ever ready to come into open revolt 
at the slightest provocation, whether imaginary or 
otherwise, and on such occasions all attempts made by 
the Europeans in authorfiy to reason with them are met 
with jeers and insults. 
And also: 
At Kimberley ... the Basuto are always regarded as the 
most troublesome element in the Compounds, and ... in 
Basutoland I have noticed derisive shouting and 
gestures from the herdboys and a disinclination among 
older folk to discourage ... dogs from making 
themselves objectionable to European travellers. 
Young men on horseback pass one ... with a sneer or 
a scowl instead of the friendly greeting of the Cape 
Colony, the salute of Natal or the silent deference of 
the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Mud slinging 
and stone throwing on the part of the small boys, and 
the wilful startling of cart horses are said not to be 
uncommon. 
These things may be mischief, but mischief of a . 
disrespectful almost aggressive sort, and it is 
certainly not pleasant to conjecture up pictures of a 
conflict precipitated by the spurious class 
antagonisms which are being fostered by the agitators 
of labour (sic), when aggravateg4$Y deep-rooted 
antipathies of race and colour. 
The solution proposed was that the police force in Fauresmith and Jagersfontein be 
increased "to say thirty menv. 
The period we have discussed was one of instability in South Africa, 
consequent on economic depression, the dislocations involved in unifying local 
institutions and in reconstituting the army. The ruling class was split, and the 
army command was close to mutiny. With war in Europe imminent, the government, in 
its moment of triumph in January 1914, was probably at its weakest. If the armed 
rebellion had not been suppressed so speedily after war was declared, the government 
would have been saved only through an occupation by Imperial troops. But, despite 
their belief that the railway strike had been provoked to destroy the labour 
movement, and their anger at the deportation of the strike leadfs~, Labour was still 
prepared to come to the government's aid when war was declared. 
During the events of 1913-14, the perpetrators of the worst outrages were 
the government, the mine owners, and the British m y .  However, over and above the 
actions of the'army and police force, the white workers, when not involved in 
struggle with the Randlords or the government, were themselves agents of repression. 
They shot down workers at the diamond mines, acted as temporary warders in the Natal 
collieries15~d formed vigilante groups to stop Indians crossing into the 
Transvaal. Consequently, in January 1914, when white miners at Premier mines 
joined the general strike, Africans just carried on working. If some white trade 
unionists were aware of the contradictions in their organizations, and Labour 
leaders were beginning to percieve the nature of the problems they faced, they were 
still blinkered by the belief that white labour alone could effect change in the 
country, and the SALP still declared in December 1914 that: 
The Merriman motion, calculated t o  put the Labour 
Party i n  a c l e f t  s t i c k ,  and t o  fur ther  Corner House 
schemes, namely, t o  abolish the  Colour B a r  on the  
Transvaal Mines, met with such puissant counter 
a t tacks  from our members thaf&he sponsors of the  
scheme hurriedly dropped it. 
Some white s o c i a l i s t s  did cross the  colour l i n e ,  but t h i s  w a s  exceptional. 
Amongst the  f i r s t  public declarations of support was t h a t  of J T Bain, secretary of 
the  Federation of Trades, who supported the  Indian workers and hoped t h a t  
a t  a l a t e r  date the  party of which he w a s  secretary 
would endorse ( h i s  statement) t h a t  an injury done t o  , 
the most humble of t h e i r  race w a s  an injury done t o  
humanity. They must f i g h t  f o r  human r igh t s ,  whether 
f o r  the coloured o r  white people. Race must not t e l l .  
He characterized I 1 t &  indentured system as  (one) of slavery glossed over and 
disguised by lawn. Then came a meeting i n  Johannesburg attended by several  
prominent white trade unionists. T W Ward (one of those arres ted i n  July 1913), 
speaking on behalf of Bain, described the  movement of the  Indians a s  
an expression of t h e i r  r evo l t  against oppression. But 
the  r e a l  cause was economic ... He was not going t o  
advise them against passive resistance,  but he warned 
them t o  be careful ,  and t o  be ready t o  be shot down. 
He w a s  not  there  t o  stir up race prejudice, but came 
as representing a small minority of white workers on 
the Reef, who real ised t h a t  the Indians1 f i g h t  was the  
white workers1 f i g h t  ... Your brothers i n  Natal a r e  
f ight ing your f ight .  Their f igh t  today w i l l  be your 
f i g h t  tomorrow. Do not  forget  there were a few white 
men y&$ling t o  forego a l l  questions of colour t o  help 
you. 
But Bain was v i l i f i e d  i n  l e t t e r s  t o  the  Evening Chronicle, which had 
provided the  f u l l e s t  report  of what he had sa id ,  and the  Natal Federation of Trade 
and Labour Unions, a t  a meeting of delegates, reaffirmed the  Labour standpoint and 
called on the government t o  speed repatr ia t ion.  Herein l ay  the  tragedy: the  white 
workers, embattled i n  1913-14 against  mine magnates and governmfsfj, while 
stregthening t h e i r  unions and building (white) c lass  so l ida r i ty  , never extended a 
hand t o  the  blacks. Their demand f o r  secur i ty  was won only a t  the  expense of t h e i r  
own, unrealised working-class i n t e r e s t s  - and t h i s  was the  basis f o r  the  compromise 
they eventually secured from the  rul ing c lass .  
The posit ion of blacks cannot be placed on a par with whites - jus t  as the 
in te res t s  of slaves could never be compared with those of t h e i r  enslavers, but it 
must be noted t h a t  the  actions of the  black leadership did l i t t l e  t o  commend them. 
Sol Plaat je ,  c l j p i o n  of the black women, blocked an ANC vote of so l ida r i ty  with 
white s t r i k e r s  ; Gandhi cal led  off  h i s  campaign i n  January 1914, t o  avoid 
embarrassing the  author i t ies ;  and Abdurahman used h i s  gibes against  white 
repression t o  plead f o r  the  economic advancement of Coloured businessmen. They 
reflected,  i n  a very dis tor ted mirror, the  pusillanimous approach of the  white 
working class.  
W a r  was declared i n  Europe i n  August and extended t o  Africa, r a i s ing  new 
issues. The leaders of the ANC, the  APO, and the  Indian movement a l l  supported the  
governmentls w a r  e f f o r t ,  and the  white working c lass  - o r  a t  l e a s t  the  
English-speaking section - trooped t o  the colours. The Afrikaner workers were i n  
dissent,  but they were t i e d  too so l id ly  t o  the  Nationalist camp t o  provide any 
answers. A t iny  group of SALP leaders maintained an in te rna t iona l i s t  posit ion and 
they formed a W a r  on W a r  League. Its leaders were among those who were radicalized 
by the  events of July 1913 - January 1914, but they had n o t  had enough time t o  
capi ta l ize  on the  experiences of the  s t r ikes .  The "War-on-WaritesI1 were i n  a 
minority i n  the  SALP, and many of t h e i r  adherents re t reated before the  wave of 
patriotism t h a t  swept the  country. 
A shor t  boom i n  t h e  diamond industry from 19111& 1913 ended, and the  
mines were closed from September 1914 till January 1916. - leading t o  the  
repatr ia t ion of a l l  migrant workers. "Diamonds were forever" (perhaps) but were not 
wanted then: but, t o  finance the  war, gold production expanded and Afkicans were 
used as  semi-skilled replacements f o r  miners who joined the  army. And during the  
war industries expanded, absorbing new layers of black workers and t i l t i n g  the  c lass  
balance towards an urban black prole tar ia t .  The radical  s o c i a l i s t s ,  confronted by 
new soc ia l  forces,  rejected the  colour bar but were st i l l  convinced t h a t  the  white 
working c lass ,  who had fought so  val iant ly ,  were a revolutionary force. This 
heritage, understandable i n  terms of the events of 1913-14, w a s  not  eas i ly  brushed 
aside - but it was t o  cost  the  s o c i a l i s t  movement dearly. 
J u l i a  Wells did the  research work on the  women's anti+- campaign f o r  her PhD; 
Judie Jancovich sought out the  information on Jagersfontein; and Baruch Hirson 
found new material on the  s t r ikes ,  f o r  a biography (together w i t h  Gwyn Williams) 
on D Ivon Jones. 
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